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Abstract  
 
In the context of high loss in the storage and transportation of fresh 
agricultural products, in order to help company make reasonable 
fresh-keeping decisions and reduce losses, we  established a leading 
supplier of fresh agricultural products in two level dual channel 
supply chain model based on consumer utility function, and using 
Stackelberg game method to solve the optimal pricing and optimal 
fresh-keeping decision of fresh agricultural supplier and retailer 
under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-
making model. Research shows: (1) Under centralized decision-
making model, the highest profit does not affect the cooperation and 
achieve complete coordination regardless of the bargaining power of 
the retailer; (2) High cost factor of fresh-keeping efforts makes 
supplier and retailer more inclined to lower prices to attract 
consumers. (3)The “revenue sharing + fresh-keeping cost sharing” 
coordination strategy provided by the supplier can increase the 
respective profits of both parties and achieve complete coordination 
of the dual-channel supply chain of fresh agricultural products. 
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1. Introduction 
With the improvement of  people's living standard, consumers pay more and more attention to the fresh 
agricultural product freshness and flavor. In addition, China is a large agricultural country. In the process of  
transportation and storage, due to insufficient cold storage infrastructure and other fresh-keeping measures, 
the annual loss of  fresh agricultural products has exceeded 300 billion in China. Under this background, this 
paper studies the fresh-keeping of  fresh agricultural products in the supply chain, and puts forward the 
coordination strategy of  node enterprises in fresh agricultural products dual-channel supply chain, which has 
double significance to improve the efficiency of  enterprises and consumer life satisfaction. 
Ferguson and Ketzenberg (2006) pointed out that food retailer may cause up to 15% loss due to damage 
and corruption of  perishable items in Western developed countries. Fresh agricultural products have the 
characteristics of  being corrosive and have a large loss during production and transportation. Martin (2015) 
pointed out that more than 25% of  fruits and vegetables in China will deteriorate in transportation to 
wholesale markets and stores. So in this context, many scholars began to study the supply chain of  fresh 
agricultural products. For example, Yu and Nagurney (2013) studied the network-based fresh agricultural 
product supply chain model, and set product differentiation due to the freshness and corrosion resistance of  
the product. The variational inequality formula of  Cournot-Nash equilibrium condition in food supply chain 
network is used to indicate that product differentiation may be an effective strategy for enterprises to maintain 
financial flexibility. Huang, He, and Li (2018) studied the Stackelberg game model of  a three-level food supply 
chain, studied the optimal pricing, inventory decisions and maximize profits of  products under decentralized 
decision making. The results show that the vertical cooperation of  supply chain members helps to increase the 
total profit, and the retailer's protection investment is not only beneficial to itself, but also beneficial to supplier. 
The high loss rate caused by the corrosiveness, irreversibility and vulnerability of  fresh agricultural 
products has always been a difficult problem for managers of  fresh agricultural products, and also a hot issue 
in academic circles. Cai, Chen, and Xiao (2010) studied the retailer's supply chain for sourcing a certain amount 
International Journal of Emerging Trends in Social Sciences, 2018, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 75-85 
 
76 
of  fresh products from supplier. During the transportation process, retailer must make appropriate efforts to 
maintain product freshness. In the decentralized and centralized decision-making model, the model is used to 
study the optimal decision of  each node of  the supply chain system. Nagurney, Besik, and Yu (2018) studied a 
competitive food supply chain network model, in which fresh agricultural producers use their supply chain 
network to produce and distribute the amount of  fresh product to maximize their own interests, and 
consumers respond to each other through the price they are willing to pay. Lee and Dye (2012) assumed that 
demand was affected by inventory levels, and retailer reduced the rate of  deterioration of  fresh product 
through the use of  fresh-keeping technology. Based on this, the retailer's replenishment plan and optimal 
fresh-keeping technology investment were studied. Aviv and Pazgal (2008) studied the pricing strategy of  
seasonal commodities. Strategic consumers market in a Poisson process and their valuations decrease over time. 
Under the inventory-related price reduction strategy and the pre-announced price reduction strategy, the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of  the game between enterprises and strategic consumers is analyzed. 
In the supply chain coordination of  fresh agricultural products, Gu, Fu, and Li (2018) studied a fresh 
product supply chain consisting of  a fresh product supplier and an e-retailer, and derived the optimal price, 
quantity and fresh-keeping effect by analyzing the model. In the end, it is shown that the rate of  return has 
nothing to do with the loss of  freshness and the loss of  consumers. The revenue sharing contract cannot 
achieve channel coordination under the formulation of  our model. Tiaojun, Danqin, and Houcai (2011) 
assumed that consumer utility is affected by product quality, service quality and retail price. On this basis, the 
retailer's optimal service quality and pricing decision are given. The final revenue sharing contract realizes the 
supply chain Pareto improvement and coordination. Su and Zhang (2008) studied the impact of  strategic 
customer behavior on supply chain performance and designed multiple contracts to achieve supply chain 
coordination. 
Based on the current research of  scholars, in the context of  the dual channel of  fresh agricultural 
products, This paper focuses on the characteristics that freshness of  fresh agricultural products decreases with 
time and the cost of  fresh-keeping effort invested by suppliers who dominate the supply chain, and construct 
the utility function influenced by freshness and price, analyzing and comparing the effects of  profit and 
optimal decision-making of  supply chain system when fresh produce suppliers put in the cost of  fresh-keeping 
effort. Finally, the two parties have formulated a reasonable fresh-keeping “cost sharing contract + revenue 
sharing” model, and achieved complete coordination. 
 
2. Model Symbols and Assumptions 
2.1. Model Symbols 
 
Table-1. Symbol Description. 
Model symbols Symbol Description 
T  Life cycle of  fresh product 
( ) t  Freshness function over time 
0  
Initial freshness of  a fresh product 
0  
Attenuation factor of  freshness of  fresh product 
k  Supplier of  fresh-keeping effort level 
  Sensitivity factor of  freshness to the fresh-keeping efforts 
  Effort cost coefficient of  fresh-keeping 
p
 
Market price of  fresh product 

 
Profit of  whole supply chain of  fresh agricultural products 
 s  
Fresh agricultural product supplier's profit 
 r  
Fresh agricultural product retailer's profit 
  Market share of  offline retail channels 
w  Retailer's wholesale price 
  Fresh-keeping cost sharing ratio 
  Revenue sharing ratio 
c  Production cost of  fresh product 
  Consumer demand at any one time 
  The market's sensitivity to the freshness of  a fresh product 
 
In addition, the unified regulation, in the superscript of  the formula, the letter c  is the centralized 
decision, the letter d  is the decentralized decision, the superscript *  indicates the coordination model; In the 
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subscript of  the formula, the subscript contains s  for the online channel, and the subscript contains r  for the 
offline channel.  
 
2.2. Model Assumption 
Assumption 1. As retailer face the whole retail market, retailer have a market advantage terminal, so 
retailer to adopt a uniform pricing, the dominant supplier and retailer to determine wholesale prices by 
negotiation. 
Assumption 2. The freshness function is 0 0
1
2( )= , (0, )  
 
  
 
t
t t T
T
，that is, the freshness function 
decreases with time, Where T represents the life cycle of  fresh product, from the beginning of  sales until the 
entire sales period of  zero the effectiveness of  fresh product, 0  indicates the freshness decay factor of  fresh 
products over time, 0  Y indicates the initial freshness of  a fresh product; In addition, the level of  effort 
invested by one party uses the product form to influence the attenuation factor 0  of  fresh product freshness, 
that is, the freshness function after inputting fresh-keeping efforts is 
1
2
0 0( )= (1 ) , (0, )   
 
   
 
t
t k t T
T
. 
Assumption 3. The fresh-keeping effort cost function is
21( )
2
C k k , where   represents the 
coefficient of  the cost of  fresh-keeping effort, and k  represents the level of  fresh-keeping efforts, and this 
form of  the second-party effort cost is widely used. 
Assumption 4. It is assumed that during the entire life cycle of  a fresh agricultural product, when the 
utility of  the consumer demand is greater than zero, the purchase behavior will occur. This paper constructs 
the utility function of  the online direct selling channel at a certain time t is   0 ( )  s sU t U p t , and 
the utility function of  the offline retailer channel at a certain time t is   0 + ( )  rrU t U p t , 0U  
represents the initial cognitive value of  the consumer to a fresh agricultural product,   represents The 
sensitivity of  the market to the freshness of  a fresh product, They all obey the uniform distribution of  [0,1] . 
Assumption 5. There is only one supplier and one retailer in the entire dual-channel supply chain system, 
and both parties have rational decision-making and risk neutrality in the case of  information sharing, which is 
in line with the conditions of  the Stackelberg game model. 
 
3 Problem Statement and Model 
3.1. Problem Statement 
According to the dual-channel supply chain model of  fresh agricultural products in real life, a Stackelberg 
game model is constructed, in which a single supplier of  fresh agricultural products is the leader and the 
retailer of  fresh agricultural products is the follower. On the one hand, the  retailer facing the market terminal 
determine the uniform price of  fresh agricultural products in the market; on the other hand, the upstream 
supplier take fresh agricultural products to expand sales volume, and distribute fresh agricultural products to 
retailer at wholesale prices, and retailer sell them to consumers through the model of  physical store operation; 
Fresh agricultural products supplier have actively expanded the online direct marketing channels through the 
Internet to sell fresh agricultural products directly through the network channels. The fresh agricultural 
products in the dual channel supply chain structure as shown in Figure 1. 
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Fresh agricultural 
products supplier（S）
 Fresh agricultural 
products retailer（R） Consumers
Fresh-keeping (k)
Wholesale price (W) Offline sales price (P)
Online sale price(P)
 
Figure-1. Fresh agricultural products in the dual channel supply chain structure. 
 
3.2. Centralized Decision Model 
Based on the above assumptions, only when consumers buy that utility is greater than 0, consumers will 
choose to buy some fresh agricultural products, the demand at any time under the line: 
0( ) 0)( ) (1 ) ( (1 ( )) ( )       s ssD P P U ptt U t               (1) 
0( ) 0)( ) ( ( ( ))     r rrD tt P U P U p t      (2) 
During the whole life cycle of  a fresh agricultural product, the sales volume of  fresh agricultural products 
through the supplier's online channel is as follows: 
T T
0
0 0
0 0
( ) (1 ) ( ( )
1
(1 ) ( (3 3 2 ( 1 )
)
3 ))
3
  
     
   
     


 s s sD D t dt P U p t dt
T p k
     (3) 
Similarly, the sales volume of  fresh agricultural products under offline channels is: 
T
0 0
0
1
( ) ( (3 3 2 ( 1 ) 3 ))
3
          r rD D t dt T p k   (4) 
Among them, A denotes the demand of  fresh agricultural products on-line direct marketing channels; B 
denotes the demand of  fresh agricultural products on-line and off-line retail channels; In 
addition, 0
2
3
A T ; 0 0
2
3
    B T T T . 
When the centralized decision of  fresh agricultural products supplier and retailer of  fresh agricultural 
product, this is to maximize the overall interests of  the supply chain profit as the only goal, the objective 
function of  the whole system at this time: 
( , )=( ) ( ) ( )    s rMAX p k p c D p c D C k               (5) 
Theorem 1 In the centralized model, the profit function of  the supply chain is a concave function about the 
fresh-keeping effort and price, and the profit function A has a unique maximum. 
Proof: The Hessen matrix of  supply chain profit function on price and fresh-keeping efforts is 
22 =2 0






T
A
A
T
A
,
2
2
2 0



  

T
p
, the two order Hesse matrix is negative, theorem 1 proof. 
The price and fresh-keeping efforts for a first derivative, 0



c
p
， 0



c
k
, optimal solution of  
simultaneous equations was born in dual channel supply chain of  fresh agricultural products are as follows: 
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2
2 2
=
 

  

c A c B cTp
A T
      (6) 
2
( 1)(
=
)
2
  

 

c
s
T B cT
A T
D      (7) 
2
(
2
=
) 



c
r
T cT B
A T
D         (8) 
2
c
2
=
( )



A cT B
A T
k              (9) 
Under the centralized decision, the maximum profit of  the dual channel supply chain is: 
2
2
( )
2(2
( , )=
)







c c c B cT
T A
p k     (10) 
 
3.3. Decentralized Decision Model 
Under the decentralized decision model, The supplier and retailer of  fresh agricultural products play 
Stackelberg game with the goal of  maximizing their own profits, The retailer of  fresh agricultural products 
(R) determines the uniform price of  the market according to the judgment of  the market and previous data; 
Finally, the supplier of  fresh agricultural products determined the fresh-keeping effort according to the market 
price and the wholesale price negotiated by both sides. The game process of  this decision can be described by 
the following model: 
   
 
2(1 ) +
1
 =( ) ( )  
2
. . ( )  
+
+
    
 
   

  

s
r
B Ak T p B AkMAX p c w T p
B A
c k
S T p w k T p
      (11) 
 Retailer consider the maximization of  their profits to determine the unified price of  fresh agricultural 
products ，
2
2
2 0



  

r T
p
， order 0



r
p
， The equation of the answer is 
2


 
d
B Ak Tw
p
T
。 
Theorem 2 when A=0, the profit of  fresh agricultural supplier is a concave function of  wholesale price w and 
the level of  fresh-keeping k . 
Proof: the second-order partial derivative of  profit function  s  to k  and wholesale price p  is 
 2
2
2
0
1
2




 

 

s
A
Tk
, that is
2(1 )
2





A
T
;  
2
2
1
1 0
2

 



  s
w
T , 
2 2
=
2
   

   
s s
kw w
A
k
, two order, Hesse matrix is greater than zero, namely 
2 1
(1 ) 0
4 2
    
A
T , 
that is
2
2 (1 )

 


A
T
 , therefore, the solution is
2
2 (1 )

 


A
T
G, proof  of  theorem 2. 
Under decentralized decision-making model, the optimal decision for fresh agricultural products is as 
follows is: 
2
2
( 2 )
1
=
2 ( )
  
 
  
 
d A c B B cTp
A T
  (12) 
2
2
2 ( )
2 (1 )
  
 
 



d A c B cT
A T
w      (13) 
 2
(1 )( )
2 1
  
  
  
 
ds
T B cT
A T
D   (14) 
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 
 2 2 1
 
  
 
 
dr
T B cT
A T
D      (15) 
2
( )
2 (1 )

 
 



d A B cT
A T
k       (16) 
By substituting the optimal decision of  supplier and retailer into Formula 11, the profit of  fresh product 
supplier and retailer under decentralized decision is obtained as follows:  
2
2
( )
2(2 (1 ) )
 




 
ds
B cT
T A
   (17) 
2 2
2 2(
( )
2 )(1 )
  

 

 
dr
T B cT
A T
（18） 
Therefore, in the decentralized model, according to the profits of  retailer and supplier can draw the total 
profit of  the entire supply chain: 
2 2
2 2
( ) 2 (1 2 )( )
2( 2 (1 )
=
)
  



 
   
 
d B cT A T
A T
（19） 
3.4. Comparison of Two Models 
Proposition 1 0




cp
， 0




dp
。 
Proof: By the formula 6 obtained 
2
2 2
( )
=
2( )

 




c A cT B
A T
p
, from formula 10 and formula 9, We know that the 
overall profit and freshness level of  fresh agricultural products supply chain are satisfied: 0 c , 
0 1 ck , so, we can draw: 2 2 0 A T ， 0  cT B , in summary, 0




cp
;we can 
obtain
2
2 2
1 2( )(
=
)2(
)
0
(1 )
 
 
 




 
d A B cT
A T
p
 from formula 12, and combining formula 16 and formula 17, we 
can conclude that: 0 B cT , so 0




dp
;  Proposition 1 is proved. 
Proposition 1 shows that under centralized and decentralized decision-making, the optimal price of  fresh 
agricultural products is negatively correlated with the cost coefficient of  fresh-keeping, indicating that under 
these two models, supplier of  fresh agricultural products attract consumers through fresh-keeping decision-
making will bring greater burden to themselves, combined with the timeliness of  fresh agricultural products, 
so the use of  low. Price policy attracts consumers to spend. 
Proposition 2 0




c
sD ， 0




c
rD ； 0




d
sD ， 0




d
sD  
Proof: obviously 0 B cT , so it is very easy to 
judge
2 2
2 (1 )( )
0
( 2 )
  

   
 

c
sD A T B
A T
cT
,
2
2 2
( )
0
( )2
 
 
  

 

c
rD A T B c
A T
T
,
 2
2 22 (1( )
0
)
 
  
 


 
 
d
s
A T B cT
A T
D
, proposition 2 is proved. 
Proposition 2 shows that under centralized and decentralized decision-making, the supplier of  fresh 
agricultural products invests in fresh-keeping efforts. The optimal demand of  fresh agricultural products on-
line and off-line is negatively correlated with the cost coefficient of  fresh-keeping, indicating that the demand 
of  fresh agricultural products will be reduced with the increase of  the cost coefficient of  fresh-keeping. 
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 Proposition 3 0




dk
， 0




sk
. 
Proof: The formula 9and 16 are respectively obtained. ：
2 2
2 ( )
0
( )2




 





c AT B cT
A T
k
，
2 2
2 (1
( )
)( )
0
2 (1 )
 
 
  
 




d AT B cT
A T
k
, so proposition 3 is proved.  
Proposition 3 shows that whether under centralized or decentralized decision-making, the level of  fresh-
keeping effort is negatively correlated with the coefficient of  fresh-keeping cost, indicating that the coefficient 
of  fresh-keeping cost is too large to improve the level of  fresh-keeping effort. 
Proposition 4 By comparing the two modes of  centralized decision and decentralized decision, we can 
draw a conclusion that when
2 0 A T ， c dp p ；when 2 0 A T ， c dp p 。 
Proof: From formula 6 and formula 12, we can calculate the difference in 
price.
2
2 2
2 ( )( )
( 2 )( 2 (1 ))
  
  
 

 
 
c d B cT A T
A T A T
p p ,  from Theorem 1, 2 2 0 A T  and 
0  cT B , therefore When 2 0 A T , c dp p ;When 2 0 A T , c dp p , so 
proposition 4 is proved. 
Proposition 5 The total profit of  the supply chain under centralized decision is greater than the total 
profit of  supply chain under decentralized decision,  d c 。 
Proof: We can be obtained by Theorem 1: 
2 02   T A , so we can easily get, 
2 3 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
0
(2
(
)( 2 (1 ))
)   
  
  



  
 
d d d
s r
T B cT
T A A T
, so proposition 5 is proved. 
From proposition 4 and 5, it can be concluded that the product price under centralized decision is higher 
than that under decentralized decision, while the profit of  supply chain system under centralized decision is 
greater than the total profit of  decentralized decision. Because of  the existence of  double marginal effect, the 
profit of  supply chain system under decentralized decision cannot reach the optimum, therefore, it is necessary 
to set up reasonable coordination strategy to achieve supply chain coordination as far as possible. 
  
4. "Fresh-Keeping Cost Sharing + Revenue Sharing" Coordination Contract 
Due to the existence of  double marginal effects and the limitations of  the level of  fresh keeping efforts 
provided by supplier, in the decentralized supply chain system, the loss caused by inefficient decision-making 
of  node members still occurs. In the face of  the overall poor performance of  the supply chain contract, 
scientific and reasonable can to some extent alleviate the double channel conflict. 
In this section, the coordination contract of  " fresh-keeping cost sharing and revenue sharing" is the fresh 
agricultural products supplier to share the proceeds of  online  retailer, including online  retailer can share 
earnings ratio of   ; At the same time, fresh agricultural  retailer need to share the cost of  fresh-keeping 
efforts, of  which the ratio of  sharing the cost of  fresh-keeping is  . 
The profits of  supplier for fresh agricultural products: 
(1 )( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )        s s rp c D w c D C k                     (20) 
The profits of   retailer for fresh agricultural products: 
( ) +( ) ( )     r s rp c D p w D C k               (21) 
By solving the above equation, the following solution is gained： 
     
    
*
2
1 1
2 1 1
=
1
      
   
        
      
A T c w c B
k
T A
     (22) 
      
    2
*
22 1 11
2 2 1 1 1
=
    
      
       
  
          
B A c w c
T A
p
c w
c     (23) 
In order to make the optimal value under decentralized decision-making reach the optimal value under 
centralized decision-making, it is necessary to satisfy 
*  cp p and *  ck k  under the coordination contract. 
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At this time, the wholesale price w  is no longer a decision variable, but as a regulatory variable, the supply 
chain system achieves coordination. 
Theorem 3 When the coordination contract ( , ), w  satisfies w c ,
1
 





, and when fresh- keeping 
cost sharing ratio satisfies 
2
2 2 2(
2 (2 ) 2
2 (1 ) 2 (1) )
  
     


   
 
T T A T
A T T A
, the fresh agricultural 
product supply chain is coordinated. 
Proof: By the above assumptions, it can draw w c  and 
1
 





, take them into the profit function 
of fresh agricultural supplier and retailer, We can obtain profits from retailer and 
supplier,
 
2
2
* (1 )( )
2 2
  

 
 

s
B cT
T A
, 
2
2
* ( )
2(2 )
 





r
B cT
T A
, they satisfies 
*
2
*
2( )
2( 2 )
 
 




 

  cs r
B cT
A T
, at this time, the optimal decision of fresh agricultural products supplier 
and retailer is equal to the optimal decision of supply chain system under centralized decision. In addition, it is 
also required to meet 
*  cs s  and 
*  cr r , by solving the above inequation, the following solution is 
gained： 
2
2 2 2(
2 (2 ) 2
2 (1 ) 2 (1) )
  
     


   
 
T T A T
A T T A
, so theorem 3 is proved. 
Theorem 3 shows that the contract model of  "revenue sharing + fresh-keeping cost sharing" can 
coordinate the supply chain of  fresh agricultural products. Compared with decentralized decision-making, 
retailer can control the ratio of  fresh-keeping cost to improve the profit of  supplier and retailer. In this 
contract model, although w  is an adjusting variable, it is still decided by fresh product supplier. Therefore, in 
real life, if  supplier do not set the corresponding wholesale price, fresh product supply chain will not be able to 
achieve coordination. 
 
5. Numerical Analysis 
In order to correct and rationality of  the relevant conclusions to verify the model, based on fresh 
agricultural products industry data to verify the optimal solution under different models, parameter values are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table-2. parameters assignment table. 
0  
  
0  T      
c    
0.9 300 1 20 2 0.2 1 0.4 
 
5.1. The Impact of  Fresh-Keeping Cost Coefficient   on Decision Variables 
The Table 2 into the corresponding numerical decision variables, we can get the Figure 2-4 by using 
MATLAB software. 
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
k

D
cp
dp
p

Fig-2.Effect of fresh-keeping effort cost coefficient on K Fig-3.Effect of fresh-keeping effort cost coefficient on P 
Fig-4.Effect of fresh-keeping effort cost coefficient on D  
 
Figure 2 shows that when
2
2 (1 )

 


A
T
, with the increase of  fresh-keeping cost coefficient, the level 
of  fresh-keeping effort under centralized and decentralized decision-making is reduced, which verifies 
proposition 3. 
Figure 3 shows that the increase of  fresh-keeping cost coefficient will lead to the decrease of  the optimal 
price of  fresh agricultural products under both centralized and decentralized decision-making. The analysis 
shows that the reason why the supplier and retailer of  fresh agricultural products adopt the low price is that 
with the increase of  the fresh-keeping cost coefficient, they can not obtain the advantage by adopting the 
fresh-keeping decision-making. This verifies proposition 1. 
Figure 4 shows that under centralized and decentralized decision-making, the increase of  fresh-keeping 
cost coefficient will reduce the demand for fresh agricultural products, and no matter what decision-making 
model, online channel sales volume is always higher than offline channel sales. The comparison of  the four 
curves in Figure 4 shows that the demand under centralized decision-making is higher than that under 
decentralized decision-making when the fresh-keeping cost coefficient changes, which verifies Proposition 2. 
In conclusion, under the decentralized decision-making model, the overall profit of  fresh agricultural 
products supply cannot reach the optimal system profit under the centralized decision-making, so we can 
design a certain coordination contract model for fresh agricultural products dual-channel supply chain. 
 
5.2. Numerical Example 
By substituting the parameter values of  Table 2 into the relevant table functions and taking =2200 , 
the optimal decision-making of  supplier and retailer of  fresh agricultural products under centralized and 
decentralized decision-making can be obtained, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table-3. Calculation results of  different decision models. 
Optimal value Centralized decision Decentralization decision comparison 
Optimal pricing 1.26 1.32 c dp p  
Wholesale price - 1.14 - 
Supplier fresh-keeping  0.188 0.13 c dk k  
Online sales volume 930.2 644.6 c ds sD D  
Offline sales 620.1 429.8 c dr rD D  
Supplier profit - 250.7 - 
Retailer profit - 77.0 - 
Supply chain profit 361.7 327.7  c d  
 
Table 3 shows that the reason why the profit of  supply chain under decentralized mode is not optimal 
compared with centralized mode is that, in decentralized mode, the enthusiasm of  supplier'fresh-keeping input 
is greatly affected, supplier reduce costs by reducing their fresh-keeping efforts, but because the market is 
sensitive to the freshness of  fresh agricultural products. As a result, the two-channel sales are greatly reduced, 
and ultimately the total profit of  fresh agricultural products in the two-channel supply chain system is reduced. 
Therefore, the model provides dual channel to fresh-keeping of  fresh agricultural products on the supplier in 
the double marginal effect of  decentralized mode of  fresh agricultural products in the dual channel supply 
chain model, the two sides as well as the profits of  the supply chain system have not reached the level of  
centralized mode, which verified the correctness of  the conclusion of  the former. 
Under the contract model of  "revenue sharing + fresh-keeping cost sharing ", the profit of  supplier is as 
follows: 
 
 
2
2
* (1 )( ) 361.74 1
2 2
  



 
 

s
B cT
T A
 
Under this contract model, supplier will have  361.74 1 250.7  , that is 0.31  , to ensure that 
their profits are not affected. This means that if  the profit of  fresh agricultural products supplier is greater 
than that of  supplier under decentralized decision-making, retailer are required to bear up to 31% of  the cost 
of  fresh-keeping effort, so that the optimal level of  fresh-keeping effort can be raised to that under centralized 
decision-making. Strive for the best price and achieve the optimal price under centralized decision. At the same 
time, the profit of  the retailer under this contract model is: 
2
2
* 361.74
2(2
)
)
(







r
B cT
T A
 
This shows that if  the retailer accepts the contract model, the retailer needs to consider its own profit 
higher than the profit under the decentralized decision-making. There is 361.74 77.0  ，  that 
is 0.21  , indicating that the retailer needs to bear at least 21% of  the cost of  preservation effort, which can 
make the fresh agricultural products supply chain to achieve coordination. 
Therefore, in this coordination contract model ( , , ) w , the value of    must satisfy [0.21,0.31] , 
and the specific value   also depends on the bargaining power between fresh produce suppliers and retailer. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the past, the dual-channel supply chain of  fresh agricultural products neglected the effect of  fresh 
agricultural products fresh-keeping cost coefficient on profit. Under the condition of  retailer's uniform pricing, 
this paper considers consumer utility and consumer's novelty to fresh agricultural products under the dual-
channel supply chain system of  fresh agricultural products composed of  a single supplier and a single retailer. 
Under the background of  freshness requirement, a dual-channel supply chain model is constructed. 
Stackelberg game method is used to solve the model. A coordinated approach of  cost subsidy for fresh-keeping 
effort provided by dominant supplier is provided to improve the operational efficiency of  the dual-channel 
supply chain for fresh agricultural products. Supplier share a certain proportion of  retail insurance. Fresh cost 
effectively encourages retailer to increase the cost of  retail channel fresh-keeping investment, making the sales 
volume of  offline channels increased, and thus making the profits of  both sides increased. The model analysis 
shows that, compared with the centralized model, the enthusiasm of  the decentralized model will be reduced, 
resulting in the overall sales volume of  fresh agricultural products in two channels will be reduced, which 
makes the overall supply chain efficiency reduced. The coordination model of  "revenue sharing + fresh-
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keeping cost sharing" proposed by supplier can be fully coordinated. The post numerical analysis shows that 
the specific proportion can improve the profits of  both sides and achieve coordination. 
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